In Ethiopia, Post-Zenawi Void Could Create Opening for Reform
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In Ethiopia, Post-Zenawi Void Could Create Opening for Reform
In Ethiopia, Post-Zenawi Void Could Create Opening for
Reform
By Peter Dörrie
Source: World Politics Review
For 20 years, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi has been the undisputed ruler of Ethiopia. Zenawi was the leader of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which in concert with its sister rebel group from Eritrea toppled the Moscow-aligned dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam in 1991. He led his country in the 1998-2000 war against his former Eritrean allies and oversaw multiple Ethiopian military interventions into neighboring Somalia. An active and outspoken leader, Zenawi is also credited with a pragmatic approach to economic development despite his Marxist roots, resulting in an average of 9 percent GDP growth over the past 10 years.
Now the strong man of the Horn of Africa has disappeared -- literally: For almost two months, Zenawi has not appeared in public. Nor has he given any interviews and or any other indication that he is still alive, despite a high-profile summit of the African Union currently taking place in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa.
The country’s ruling coalition, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), has confirmed that medical issues are the reason for Zenawi’s “leave of absence,” but insists that he is recovering well and will resume working in September. But even if he does, Zenawi’s absence is a useful reminder for the governments of Ethiopia’s neighbors and its Western allies that, for the first time in two decades, they would do well to think about a post-Zenawi Ethiopia.
As president and prime minister since 1991, Zenawi has monopolized all political, military and economic power in Ethiopia in the hands of a small elite, dominated by members of his Tigrinya ethnic group. He himself is the centerpiece of this structure and also the main link between Ethiopia and its Western donors.
During his time in power, Zenawi has deployed his military against three of his neighbors, in Sudan, Eritrea and Somalia. As a consequence, Ethiopia wields an enormous potential to influence politics in these countries. Often these military adventures originated not from purely domestic considerations, but to underline Zenawi’s position as a reliable ally in the U.S. war against terrorism. Indeed, Ethiopia’s present military dominance in the region and the West’s silence on Zenawi’s rampant human rights abuses and suppression of political opposition comes thanks to Washington’s financial and political backing.
But this support could have unwanted consequences should Zenawi be forced to give up the reins, and whether that transition occurs now or some years down the road doesn’t matter much. The consolidation of power in the hands of a small ethnic elite in Ethiopia has created growing discontent from those feeling increasingly marginalized. Already, Afar and Somali nomads as well as Oromo rebel groups wage a low-intensity insurgency against the central government, and protests from conservative Muslim organizations have rocked the capital.
While Zenawi has been able to suppress this discontent due to his complete personal control of all aspects of state power, it is unlikely that any successor will achieve the same level of dominance. The resulting power vacuum could lead to more protests in the main cities and increased activity of rebel groups in the remote areas of the country.
Though the prospect of a post-Zenawi Ethiopia creates potential risks for domestic elites as well as for Ethiopia’s foreign donors, it also presents an excellent opportunity to reassess their priorities. A business-as-usual approach is not sustainable, as the current trajectory of an authoritarian developmental state that mainly benefits a small elite, in combination with no political space whatsoever and periodic military adventures into neighboring states, will tear Ethiopian society apart sooner or later.
But a change in leadership offers an opening for democratic reform. This would include measures to ensure freedom of speech and the press, in which Ethiopia ranks at the bottom of all African countries, as well as opening the political space to allow an organized opposition to emerge. During the last general elections in 2010, the EPRDF “won” more than 99 percent of the seats in parliament. The resulting one-party state has been merciless in cracking down on opponents, essentially channeling legitimate grievances about political marginalization and unequal distribution of economic benefits and development aid into low-intensity insurgencies and protests by conservative Muslim organizations.
Meanwhile, due to significant Chinese investment into transport infrastructure, a huge potential for hydroelectricity generation and the opening of a new economic corridor on its southern border (due to the emergence of South Sudan and the construction of a new Kenyan port at Lamu), Ethiopia is well-positioned to shift from being purely a military power, to becoming the economic heavyweight of the Horn.
Trying to conserve the country’s current political power structure will endanger this goal. Zenawi himself often refers to China as his model, openly dismissing the need for democratic reform. But he -- and those who advocate following this model after Zenawi himself is gone -- overlook an important point: Though China is not a participatory society, the Communist Party elite has managed to create the impression of unity. In Ethiopia, the ruling elite is heavily associated with a single ethnic group, which is not even the largest in the country’s incredibly diverse society.
Pushing for more participation and inclusive economic growth will benefit all Ethiopians in the long run, even those elites who would have to give up some measure of control now. Betting on keeping the current elite in power may sound tempting to its members and allies in the East and West, eager to avoid complicating current military and economic cooperation. But everybody should be aware that until now, the system worked because of Zenawi’s ability to keep domestic elites and foreign partners happy, while keeping a tight lid on the country’s many grievances. Should his successor prove to be less capable, Ethiopia could soon be boiling over.
Peter Dörrie is a freelance journalist based in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, from where he reports on development and security in Africa. He blogs at www.peter-doerrie.de and tweets as @PeterDoerrie.
By Peter Dörrie
Source: World Politics Review
For 20 years, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi has been the undisputed ruler of Ethiopia. Zenawi was the leader of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which in concert with its sister rebel group from Eritrea toppled the Moscow-aligned dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam in 1991. He led his country in the 1998-2000 war against his former Eritrean allies and oversaw multiple Ethiopian military interventions into neighboring Somalia. An active and outspoken leader, Zenawi is also credited with a pragmatic approach to economic development despite his Marxist roots, resulting in an average of 9 percent GDP growth over the past 10 years.
Now the strong man of the Horn of Africa has disappeared -- literally: For almost two months, Zenawi has not appeared in public. Nor has he given any interviews and or any other indication that he is still alive, despite a high-profile summit of the African Union currently taking place in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa.
The country’s ruling coalition, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), has confirmed that medical issues are the reason for Zenawi’s “leave of absence,” but insists that he is recovering well and will resume working in September. But even if he does, Zenawi’s absence is a useful reminder for the governments of Ethiopia’s neighbors and its Western allies that, for the first time in two decades, they would do well to think about a post-Zenawi Ethiopia.
As president and prime minister since 1991, Zenawi has monopolized all political, military and economic power in Ethiopia in the hands of a small elite, dominated by members of his Tigrinya ethnic group. He himself is the centerpiece of this structure and also the main link between Ethiopia and its Western donors.
During his time in power, Zenawi has deployed his military against three of his neighbors, in Sudan, Eritrea and Somalia. As a consequence, Ethiopia wields an enormous potential to influence politics in these countries. Often these military adventures originated not from purely domestic considerations, but to underline Zenawi’s position as a reliable ally in the U.S. war against terrorism. Indeed, Ethiopia’s present military dominance in the region and the West’s silence on Zenawi’s rampant human rights abuses and suppression of political opposition comes thanks to Washington’s financial and political backing.
But this support could have unwanted consequences should Zenawi be forced to give up the reins, and whether that transition occurs now or some years down the road doesn’t matter much. The consolidation of power in the hands of a small ethnic elite in Ethiopia has created growing discontent from those feeling increasingly marginalized. Already, Afar and Somali nomads as well as Oromo rebel groups wage a low-intensity insurgency against the central government, and protests from conservative Muslim organizations have rocked the capital.
While Zenawi has been able to suppress this discontent due to his complete personal control of all aspects of state power, it is unlikely that any successor will achieve the same level of dominance. The resulting power vacuum could lead to more protests in the main cities and increased activity of rebel groups in the remote areas of the country.
Though the prospect of a post-Zenawi Ethiopia creates potential risks for domestic elites as well as for Ethiopia’s foreign donors, it also presents an excellent opportunity to reassess their priorities. A business-as-usual approach is not sustainable, as the current trajectory of an authoritarian developmental state that mainly benefits a small elite, in combination with no political space whatsoever and periodic military adventures into neighboring states, will tear Ethiopian society apart sooner or later.
But a change in leadership offers an opening for democratic reform. This would include measures to ensure freedom of speech and the press, in which Ethiopia ranks at the bottom of all African countries, as well as opening the political space to allow an organized opposition to emerge. During the last general elections in 2010, the EPRDF “won” more than 99 percent of the seats in parliament. The resulting one-party state has been merciless in cracking down on opponents, essentially channeling legitimate grievances about political marginalization and unequal distribution of economic benefits and development aid into low-intensity insurgencies and protests by conservative Muslim organizations.
Meanwhile, due to significant Chinese investment into transport infrastructure, a huge potential for hydroelectricity generation and the opening of a new economic corridor on its southern border (due to the emergence of South Sudan and the construction of a new Kenyan port at Lamu), Ethiopia is well-positioned to shift from being purely a military power, to becoming the economic heavyweight of the Horn.
Trying to conserve the country’s current political power structure will endanger this goal. Zenawi himself often refers to China as his model, openly dismissing the need for democratic reform. But he -- and those who advocate following this model after Zenawi himself is gone -- overlook an important point: Though China is not a participatory society, the Communist Party elite has managed to create the impression of unity. In Ethiopia, the ruling elite is heavily associated with a single ethnic group, which is not even the largest in the country’s incredibly diverse society.
Pushing for more participation and inclusive economic growth will benefit all Ethiopians in the long run, even those elites who would have to give up some measure of control now. Betting on keeping the current elite in power may sound tempting to its members and allies in the East and West, eager to avoid complicating current military and economic cooperation. But everybody should be aware that until now, the system worked because of Zenawi’s ability to keep domestic elites and foreign partners happy, while keeping a tight lid on the country’s many grievances. Should his successor prove to be less capable, Ethiopia could soon be boiling over.
Peter Dörrie is a freelance journalist based in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, from where he reports on development and security in Africa. He blogs at www.peter-doerrie.de and tweets as @PeterDoerrie.
Tags: meles zenawi, politics
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